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Abstract- Healthcare requires a new approach with respect to 
the secure management of information. For this purpose we 
extend the Role Based Access Control model with context 
awareness, exceptions and delegation. By combining this 
extended model with common notions from the field of 
Enterprise/Digital Rights Management we obtain a framework 
for controlling shared information in a distributed environment.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Advances in information and communication technologies 
are expected to bring large benefits in the healthcare domain: 
the introduction of interoperable Electronic Health Record 
(EHR) systems [1] can reduce the cost of the healthcare 
system and enhance the overall quality of treatments, whereas 
Remote Patient Management services [2] will limit the time a 
patient stays in hospital. However, the application of 
information technology in a very complex healthcare 
environment has led to new security requirements, such as 
privacy concerns related to access of patient records outside 
the controlled environment of a hospital. These requirements 
are also recognized by security and privacy regulations (such 
as EU Directive 95/46 [3] or HIPAA [4] in the US) to which 
healthcare solutions have to comply. 
Modern healthcare architectures tend to be open, 
interconnected environments. Therefore, sensitive patient 
records no longer reside on mainframes physically isolated 
within a healthcare provider, where physical security measures 
can be taken to defend the data and the system. Patient files 
are rather kept in an environment where data is outsourced to 
or processed on partially untrusted servers in order to allow 
de-centralized access for family doctors, medical specialists, 
pharmacists, and even non-medical care providers. The 
currently employed server-centric protection model, which 
locks the data in a database server and uses a traditional access 
control model to permit access to data, cannot efficiently deal 
with the requirements of the new healthcare infrastructures in 
which patient data may reside outside the control of the central 
server. 
In order to allow sharing of records among different 
healthcare providers or with external parties, end-to-end 
security techniques facilitating data-centric protection have 
been suggested [5,6]: data is cryptographically protected and 
allowed to be outsourced or even freely float on the network. 
Rather than relying on different networks to provide 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity, data is protected at 
the end points of the communication. However, this is not 
straightforward to achieve in the healthcare domain. One of 
the most important challenges in this domain is the 
implementation of an advanced role-based access control 
system (RBAC) which fulfills healthcare requirements. In 
particular, the introduction of exceptions and context 
awareness makes it hard to use an existing enterprise or digital 
rights management system for this purpose. 
A particular example requirement to access control 
mechanisms is that, according to HIPAA, patients have the 
right to request restrictions (exceptions) with respect to access 
to their health records. A patient could request restrictions on 
the disclosure of their records to certain individuals involved 
in his care that otherwise are permitted (with respect to role-
based access control governed by care institutions). 
Furthermore patients have the right to completely hide certain 
records in their EHRs from healthcare providers. Similar 
requirements can also be found in the specifications of 
national EHR systems that are under development (see for 
example the UK Spine system [7]). Obviously, this poses 
additional requirements on confidentiality and access control 
with respect to health records. Namely, in some cases access is 
based on roles, in other cases, it is not only based on roles but 
also on individual’s restrictions. Therefore, there is a clear 
need for a combination of role-based access control and 
patient-managed access control. Furthermore, complementing 
access control with context awareness and delegation are of 
utmost importance in the healthcare domain.  
In this work we address the aforementioned problems by 
extending the traditional role-based access control model to 
fulfill the new requirements. Then we implement this model in 
the DRM context allowing its application in new distributed 
and off-line scenarios of future healthcare. Finally we describe 
a DRM architecture that encapsulates our solution and discuss 
several improvements related to license management and 
permission evaluation. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Sandhu is often seen as the originator of role-based access 
control. In one of his papers [8] several role-based access 
control models are introduced. The four models described in 
his paper are the base model, the role hierarchies, the 
constraints model, and the consolidated model. The basic 
model defines only the smallest set of relations to allow a role-
based access control setting. This model contains four entities: 
Users, Roles, Permissions, and Sessions. In the consecutive 
model, role hierarchies are introduced. This extension to the 
base model defines a relation, which is a partial order, on roles 
that defines permissions that are inherited from another role. 
Hierarchies introduce a natural way of reflecting an actual 
organization’s line of responsibility. 
Another extension to the basic model introduces constraints 
on all relations of the model. This allows defining conditions 
that determine the acceptability of various components in the 
basic model. Constraints (such as mutually exclusive roles, 
cardinality, etc.) are a very important part of an RBAC model. 
The consolidated model of Sandhu combines constraints and 
role hierarchy. This model is further extended in the next 
section to fulfill the aforementioned requirements in the 
healthcare domain. 
As already mentioned, context information is very 
important in the healthcare domain. It can be used to 
characterize the situation of an entity (e.g. patient records 
should be accessible to all staff in an emergency room, 
irrespective of their normal permissions). In the literature, 
context is very often taken into account as part of the RBAC 
model. In the papers of Covington [9, 10], environment roles 
are introduced. These are actually part of the formal model 
defining the role-based access control system. His architecture 
is based on an extension of the role-based access control 
model [11]. A negative aspect about this approach is that one 
has to model the context in a way that it fits into roles. 
Another practical issue is that this method increases the 
administrative complexity in managing access control policies. 
While Covington extends the general RBAC model to 
create context-awareness mainly on the permissions to roles 
assignment, Wullems [12] defines context-awareness on the 
users to roles assignment and authentication of users to the 
system. This approach is designed to augment existing 
security protocols and therefore he focuses on the 
implementation of the architecture. In this paper, we will 
define constraints and context over the complete model and 
make the instantiation of the formal model more transparent. 
III. EXTENDED RBAC MODEL 
This chapter describes the evolution of Sandhu’s standard 
RBAC model [8] into the context-aware RBAC model with 
exceptions (CARBAC-E) that is suitable for the healthcare 
domain. We take the consolidated model of Sandhu, as the 
basis and extend it, first to allow exceptions on permission 
policies (the DAC-like user and role exceptions) and secondly 
to allow object categorization.  
With the extended model, it is possible to define 
personalization of default policies. Patients can define 
exceptions and therefore overrule permissions that are 
indirectly assigned to users via the membership relation. In the 
same way as user-based exceptions, role-based exceptions can 
be defined. They overrule permissions that are directly 
assigned to roles. Next to that, the model is extended with 
categories that contain objects. This creates flexibility in 
policy management, as one can directly use default policies 
instead of using templates to generate custom policies. 
Figure 1 depicts the extended model that combines the 
above-mentioned features.  
Figure 1. The extended model. 
A. Formalization 
Figure 1 provides an intuitive understanding of the model, 
but it does not unambiguously define it. To address this point 
as well as to allow for verification and unambiguous 
implementation, we provide its formal definition below. 
Definition 1: Actions (A). Let A be the set of all actions that 
can be used in the definition of permissions: A = {aB1 B..aBnB}, 
where a single action is represented by the tuple aBiB: (action: 
String). A few examples of actions are view, write, print, etc. 
Definition 2: Permission Types (T). Let T be the set of all 
types that can be used in the definition of permissions: T = {+, 
-, ?}. A permission can be of type allow (+), deny (-), or not-
known (?). Every permission that is not specified is interpreted 
as a permission with type ‘?’. The ordering on types is - ≥ + 
≥ ?. This means that negative permissions overrule positive 
permissions. The max function, which will be used later in the 
evaluation phase, is defined on pairs and sets of types (V):  
max(tB1B, tB2 B) =   tB1 B    if tB1B ≥ tB2 
  tB2 B    if tB2B > tB1B 
 
max(V) =   ?    if |V| = 0 
  head(V)   if |V| = 1 
  max(head(V), max(tail(V))) if |V| ≥ 2 
Definition 3: Users (U). Let U be the set containing all users 
that take part in the model: U = {uB1B..uBn B}, where a single user is 
represented by the tuple u BiB: (userName: String). In practice, a 
user has more attributes than his name. 
Definition 4: Roles (R). Let R be the set containing all roles 
that are part of the model; R = {r B1B..rBn B}, where a single role is 
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represented by the tuple rBiB: (roleName: String). Some 
examples of roles are nurse, doctor, radiologist, etc. 
Definition 5: Permissions (P). Let P be the set containing all 
permissions that can be executed on objects by users assigned 
to roles: P = {pB1 B..pBnB}, where a single permission is represented 
by the tuple pBiB: (action: A, type: T [, delegate: Int]). The action 
attribute describes the actual permission, like view, print, etc. 
The second attribute is type, which specifies whether the 
action is allowed or denied. The last attribute is optional and 
indicates the number of times the permission can be delegated 
to other roles. It is only allowed on permissions of type +. If 
this value is not provided, it will be interpreted as a permission 
that cannot be delegated. 
Definition 6: Objects (O). Let O be the set containing all 
objects that are part of the model: O = {oB1B..oBnB}, where a single 
object is represented by the tuple oBiB: (objectReference: URI). 
The uniform resource identifier (URI) is a reference to the 
object’s resource. 
Definition 7: Categories (C). Let C be the set containing all 
objects categories that are part of the model: C = {cB1B..cBnB}, 
where a single category is represented by the tuple cBiB: 
(categoryName: String). An example of a category is the set of 
all radiology images for a patient. 
Definition 8: Membership (UR). Let UR be the set 
containing all membership assignments that are part of the 
model: UR ⊆ U x R. UR is a many-to-many relation defining 
users’ membership in roles. This relation is responsible for the 
dynamic nature of this model. Using the membership relation 
a user is easily assigned to permissions that correspond to the 
specific role. 
Definition 9: Role Hierarchy (RH). Let RH be the set 
defining inheritance on roles that are part of the model: RH ⊆ 
R x R. A role can inherit permissions from another role. RH is 
a partial order defining the inheritance of roles. This means 
that the RH relation must be reflexive, asymmetric and 
transitive. Therefore we will also use ≥ to define this order. 
The meaning of r ≥ r’ is that role r inherits all permissions 
of role r’ and maybe contains additional permission 
assignments. As we also want to use the notion of direct 
children, we introduce →, which is defined as follows: 
r → r’ ⇔ r ≥ r’ ∧ r ≠ r’ ∧ ¬(∃r’’: r ≠ r’’ ∧ r’ ≠ r’’: r ≥ r’’ ≥ r’) 
Definition 10: Policy (RPC). Let RPC be the set containing 
all permissions on object categories that roles in the model 
have: RPC ⊆ R x P x C. The default permissions that roles 
have on certain object categories, called RPC, is a many-to-
many-to-many relation that binds permissions to categories 
and roles. The RPC relation is better known as the default 
policy (in the original RBAC model defined as the role-
permission-object relation). This relation is rather static, 
because the default policy is the same for every document of 
the same type. Because categories are used, policies are not 
defined on objects but on categories. All policies remain fairly 
static for each category. There is no need to create new 
relations for each new object and therefore no need for 
templates. Another advantage of this construction is that 
changes to a default policy immediately hold for all objects 
because they hold for categories that contain objects. 
Definition 11: User-based Policy Exceptions (EUPO). Let 
EUPO be the set containing all permission exceptions on 
objects based on users that are part of the model: EUPO ⊆ U x 
P x O. The permission exceptions that users have on certain 
objects called EUPO, is a many-to-many-to-many relation that 
binds exceptional permissions directly to users. This relation 
is used to specify individual exceptions on a default policy. 
Definition 12: Role-based Policy Exceptions (ERPO). Let 
ERPO be the set containing all permission exceptions on 
objects based on roles that are part of the model: ERPO ⊆ R x 
P x O. The permission exceptions that roles have on certain 
objects called ERPO, is a many-to-many-to-many relation that 
binds exceptional permissions related to an object to all users 
that are assigned to a particular role. 
Definition 13: Categorization (OC). Let OC be the set 
containing all object categorizations that are part of the model: 
OC ⊆ O x C. The object categorization is a many-to-many 
relation that classifies objects into categories. 
Definition 14: Complete RBAC Model (CARBAC-E). The 
extended model is now defined as the following tuple: 
CARBAC-E = (U, R, P, O, C, UR, RH, OC, RPC, EUPO, 
ERPO). 
B. Permission Evaluation 
Due to exceptions and a role hierarchy, the extended model 
requires different permission evaluation than a traditional 
RBAC model. When the system, based on a user request, 
determines if the user should have access to a requested record, 
in our case, the following checks have to be made: 
• (step 1) first if there is an exception for the user in 
question (EUPO), then 
• (step 2) exceptions for the role to which the user 
belongs (ERPO) and 
• (step 3) finally the default policy RPC. 
The role hierarchy (the RH relation in our model) 
introduces additional changes in the process of evaluating 
permissions. If the evaluation process is not clearly resolved at 
the level of the role that is in question (resulting in a positive 
or negative permission), then step 2 and after that step 3 from 
the procedure defined above have to be recursively performed 
at the levels, which are higher in the hierarchy (recursively 
through all parent roles). Appendix A provides a detailed 
description of such an algorithm. 
The introduction of the role hierarchy influences also role-
based exceptions (ERPOs), which should also be inherited to 
allow easy administrationTPF1FPT. If a patient wants to deny access 
to a specific document for everyone, it is enough to create an 
ERPO at the root (public) role from which all roles inherit 
permissions. However, inheritance of ERPOs could also cause 
                                                          
TP
1
PT One can choose not to inherit ERPOs, which means that ERPOs 
have to be specified for all relevant nodes in the hierarchy (which is 
definitely much more complex and not in accordance with the idea of 
role hierarchy and inheritance). 
some problems. For example, consider a case where a patient 
wants to exclude a specific role while keeping the other roles 
that inherit permission from that role in the access list (an 
example is given in Figure 2 where a patient excludes role 2 
while having role 3, 4 and 6 still be able to access the data). 
Then a negative permission in an ERPO has to be assigned to 
role 2, while to avoid that the other roles inherit this 
permission, positive ERPOs have to be assigned to the roles 
on the next (lower) level in hierarchy (here roles 3, and 4). 
This is denoted in Figure 2a. To make this more efficient we 
suggest to divide ERPOs into local and global ERPOs, where 
local ERPOs will be valid only for the role for which they are 
specified (and will not be inherited). On the other hand global 
ERPOs will be inherited. Then the above-mentioned example 
can be solved with only one local negative ERPO as shown in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Example local and global ERPO. 
  
IV. EXTENDED RBAC IN DRM CONTEXT 
To enable controlled sharing of information in a distributed 
system as well as the offline use, we implement this model in 
a DRM setting (architecture is shown in Figure 3). 
Consequently, we have to transfer the relevant part of the 
model to the client and evaluate the permissions client-side. 
Another quite important reason why we need to evaluate 
permissions client-side is that they could require context 
which can only be evaluated in the client-side environment. 
A. Certificates 
To support client-based evaluation of the model, every 
relation in that model has to be represented by a certificate. 
The relations UR, RH, OC, RPC, EUPO, and ERPO are 
defined below using certificates. 
UR = {User, Role, (context/constraints)*}Bsignature 
RH = {Role, ChildRole, (context/constraints)*}BsignatureB 
OC = {Object, Category, (context/constraints)*}Bsignature 
RPC = {Role, Category, Permission, (context/constraints)*}Bsig. 
EUPO = {Object, User, Permission, (context/constraints)*}Bsig. 
ERPO = {Object, Role, Permission, (context/constraints)*}Bsig. 
The EUPO certificate states which permissions are granted 
or denied to specific users, when zero or more context rules or 
constraints hold. Each permission that is specified in this type 
of certificate overrules permissions that are specified in other 
certificates with lower priorities. Similar considerations hold 
for the ERPO certificate. The only difference is that the 
exceptions are not user-based but they are role-based. This 
means that the exception is applied to every user that is 
assigned to a certain role. 
Figure 3.  DRM Architecture 
 
B. Model Instantiation 
As already mentioned, we choose to define constraints and 
context on top of the access control model, so that the 
instantiation of the formal model is more transparent. Figure 4 
shows how an instantiation is made of the formal model, what 
happens if one instantiates (part of) the model in 
certificates/licenses and validates these certificates in a certain 
context. In this figure, one can clearly see that the definition of 
the model does not change when the constraints are added. 
This implies that the formal model of the access control 
system remains the same throughout the entire usage in a real-
life system. Therefore the same formal representation is used 
at the client side (i.e., the actual access control model for a 
given user, role, context, etcetera), as well as at the server side. 
Figure 4. Usage of context in instantiation of CARBAC-E model 
C. Translation into DRM licenses and permission evaluation 
A straightforward solution for translating the extended 
RBAC model to DRM licenses is to use certificates for every 
instance of the relations in the RBAC model (as defined in 
Section IVA). A license can be used as a container holding all 
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relevant certificates for a particular permission evaluation. 
Because certificates can specify negative as well as positive 
permissions, one must be certain that all relevant permissions 
i.e. certificates are used in the permission evaluation algorithm 
(in a response to a request from a user to access a data object). 
To solve this problem a license can be created on-line to make 
sure that it contains all relevant certificates (or references to 
certificates) for a specific user and specific data object. Note 
that certificates can have different origins like some 
certificates are signed by the government and stored in a 
global database while others are signed by a hospital and 
stored in local databases. Exceptions, which are often defined 
by patients, can come from a different source. A license that 
contains all relevant certificates can be created in a centralized 
way, i.e. a central authority can contact all relevant authorities 
and include their certificates in the license. 
Definition 15: License. First, we define a certificate list, 
where all certificates are signed by trusted authorities or users: 
ClistBx B ∈ 2PSP, where the set containing all relevant certificates S 
signed by one of the parties in x, is defined as: 
S = {UR, RH, OC, RPC, EUPO, ERPO} 
Now let a license L be defined as: 
L = (ClistBxB, ObjectKey)B signature Bor L = (ClistBxB, L)B signature 
A license is an element of the power set containing all 
certificates and the key that can be used to decrypt the object. 
The license only contains relevant certificates defining the 
relations of the model that could apply to a certain user, 
requesting certain permission on certain objects. Note that a 
license can also have license specific attributes like the period 
in which the license is valid or the number of certificates a 
license contains. The object key is encrypted in a way that 
only the recipient can decrypt it and therefore use the policy to 
enforce the permissions on the object. A key management 
solution for our approach is described in our previous work 
[13, 14]. The second definition of a license is used for the 
delegation of permissions. When a user X delegates a 
permission, he takes his use-license, which states that he can 
delegate the permission, and adds the delegated permission 
including all relevant certificates. Using this formalism, 
delegations can be made without interference of the 
certification authority. 
D. Decentralized license management 
However, instead of creating a license for each request, it is 
much more flexible to allow a client to reuse certificates that 
are already available, combining certificates from different 
parties and evaluating permissions off-line. Then, "certificate 
chains" must be used to dynamically produce a valid license. 
But then it is indispensable to make sure to verify the 
completeness of data instead of using licenses to enforce this. 
For example, it is possible to optimize the RH certificate so 
that it does not need the license to verify the completeness of 
data for the permission evaluation algorithm. The previous RH 
certificate makes a relation between a role and one of its 
parent roles. Without a license that binds all relationships of a 
node in a hierarchy one cannot be sure of a completeness of a 
set of individual certificates. This could be misused by 
providing a set of certificates which exclude parent nodes 
where exceptions are defined. In that way the permission 
evaluation will not be correct. However, if each certificate 
lists all the direct parents of a node (see RH below) a client 
device can independently and unambiguously create the role 
hierarchy from different individual certificates. If no parent 
role is listed in the certificate, it means that the end of the role 
hierarchy is reached i.e. that this role has no parent roles. 
RH = {Role, ParentRoles}BsignatureB. 
We also have to make sure that EUPO and ERPO 
certificates are somehow embedded in the other certificates 
that are necessary to evaluate in order to get the required 
permission. Otherwise, someone could delete, or simply make 
these certificates that define exceptions not available. In that 
way correct evaluation of permission is not guaranteed. If 
these certificates contain negative authorizations (exceptions) 
then not presenting these certificates to the permission 
evaluation algorithm will result in wrong permission 
evaluation (e.g. granting instead of refusing access). 
To solve this problem we propose to include both EUPO 
and ERPO in an OC certificate. OC certificates describe 
mapping from objects to categories. This certificate will be 
bound to the object and stored together with the object. It is 
necessary to have an OC certificate in permission evaluation, 
therefore exceptions (or reference to appropriate EUPO and 
ERPO certificates), which are now stored in this certificate, 
cannot be avoided. 
OC = {Object, Category, (Role, Exception)*, (User, 
Exception)*}Bsignature.B 
In this way we ensured that the relevant exceptions will be 
taken into account when permissions are evaluated off-line 
without creating a license for each access request. Obviously, 
revocation of certificates must be ensured to enable timely 
update of policies (e.g. new exceptions). 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Information systems in healthcare have domain specific 
security and privacy requirements. If one would like to apply 
RBAC in these information systems to reduce the 
administrative tasks and develop a universal solution, several 
extensions including context-awareness, personalization of 
access control policies and delegation must be introduced. 
Therefore, we have proposed the CARBAC-E model that 
satisfies these specific requirements. Another aspect that is 
addressed by this paper is controlled data sharing in an open 
distributed environment and off-line scenarios. We have 
designed a DRM architecture and shown how to apply and 
enforce the proposed model in such environment. The 
proposed approach increases the data availability which is the 
most important requirement in healthcare. Furthermore, we 
have developed an algorithm that handles permission 
evaluation when conflicting permissions are present. Finally, a 
flexible method for client enforcement of the proposed model 
has been discussed. 
APPENDIX 
This appendix includes a detailed description of a 
permission evaluation algorithm. It uses three functions each 
taking care of one step of the algorithm. All these steps use the 
max function over permissions which is defined in Section 
IIIA. Below, we will provide the definition of each of the 
three steps of the algorithm. PermEval defines the permission 
evaluation for a user u trying to execute action a on object o. 
 
*** Step 1 *** 
PermEval(u, a, o): U x A x O → T 
If (∃t: t ∈ T: (u, (a, t), o) ∈ eupo): 
PermEval(u, a, o) = max({t|(u, (a, t), o) ∈ eupo}) 
Otherwise (u has no direct permission assignments): 
PermEval(u, a, o) = max({PermEvalB(erpo)B(r, a, o)|(u, r) ∈ UR}) 
 
*** Step 2 *** 
PermEvalB(erpo)B(r, a, o): R x A x O → T 
If (∃t: t ∈ T: (r, (a, t), o) ∈ erpo): 
PermEvalB(erpo)B(r, a, o) = max({t|(r, (a, t), o) ∈ erpo}) 
Otherwise (r has no direct permission assignments): 
PermEvalB(erpo)B(r, a, o) = PermEval B(rpc) B(r, a, o) 
 
*** Step 3 *** 
PermEvalB(rpc) B(r, a, o): R x A x O → T 
If node r is a leaf or (∃c: (o, c) ∈ OC: (∃t: t ∈ T: (r, (a, t), c) ∈ rpc)): 
PermEvalB(rpc) B(r, a, o) = max({t|(r, (a, t), c) ∈ rpc ∧ (o,c) ∈ OC}) 
Otherwise (r has no direct permission assignments): 
PermEvalB(rpc) B(r, a, o) = max({PermEvalB(erpo)B(r’, a, o)|r → r’}) 
 
If the algorithm does not return a positive or negative 
permission (i.e. yields "?"), this will be interpreted as a 
negative permission. 
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